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SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING STANDARDS FOR GUARDIANS:
THEORY AND REALITY
Linda S. Whitton* & Lawrence A. Frolik**
I. INTRODUCTION
Decisions—we make them every day—hundreds of them in fact, some
deliberately, others reflexively. We carefully choose what movie to see, but put
little conscious effort into choosing the route to the office. Although even routine
decisions require a choice between alternatives (for example, taking the
expressway or the secondary roads, the stairs or the elevator) the brain uses past
experiences—working memory—to reach such decisions with minimum cognitive
effort.1
Decisions that require conscious deliberation are another matter. Economists
generally explain deliberate decision making by the expected utility theory.
According to this theory, a decision is a function of the expected utility of an
outcome and the probability of that outcome.2 Psychologists, however, criticize
expected utility theory as too rational and idealistic, arguing that decision makers
rarely have complete information upon which to base a decision or the means to
accurately predict the outcome.3
Psychologists instead focus on the cognitive factors that form a reference
point for decisions by “framing” the alternatives. These factors include cognitive
biases shaped by past experiences,4 current emotions and beliefs,5 and the way
* © 2012 Linda S. Whitton. Professor of Law and Michael and Dianne Swygert
Research Fellow, Valparaiso University School of Law.
** © 2012 Lawrence A. Frolik. Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. © 2011, Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik.
All Rights Reserved. The authors wish to express their gratitude to Amy Nowaczyk, M.S.,
J.D., for her invaluable assistance with research, survey distribution, and statistical
analysis, and to Kimberly S. Wolske, Ph.D., for her expert advice on survey design and
statistical correlations.
1
See Judith A. Ouellette & Wendy Wood, Habit and Intention in Everyday Life: The
Multiple Processes by which Past Behavior Predicts Future Behavior, 124 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 54 (1998).
2
See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (Oxford
Univ. Press 1995) (attesting to the importance of analytical convenience and value of the
expected utility in guiding decision making and action).
3
See generally GREGORY ROBINSON-RIEGLER & BRIDGET ROBINSON-RIEGLER,
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: APPLYING THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND 558–60 (2004) (explaining
the expected utility theory and discussing its shortcomings).
4
Both past experiences (including prior losses and gains) and future expectations
influence decision making; however, known future outcomes (sure gains) are believed to
influence decisions more than past experiences. See E. A. Juliusson et al., Weighing the
Past and the Future in Decision Making, 17 EUR. J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 561 (2005).
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outcome probabilities are presented.6 Framing theory suggests that we choose an
alternative based on our reference point and that changing the reference point
through reframing can change our preferences, and ultimately our decision.7 For
example, surrogate decision makers may be more likely to choose life-prolonging
procedures for an incapacitated person when the patient’s prognosis is framed
positively (a doctor’s statement that 30 percent of persons in the patient’s condition
recover) versus a negative frame (that 70 percent of such patients never regain
consciousness).8
This Article addresses the two theoretical reference points used by the law to
frame how guardians should make decisions for incapacitated persons—the
substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard.9 Simply stated, the
substituted judgment standard directs the guardian to choose the alternative that the
incapacitated person would have chosen if still able to make decisions.10 The best
interest standard, by contrast, directs the guardian to choose the alternative that
produces the greatest good or benefit for the incapacitated person.11
Neither standard, however, is clear-cut when implemented. For example,
when attempting to use substituted judgment, how should a guardian determine
5

The role of emotions in decision making was studied by comparing patients with
normal intelligence but a decreased ability to feel and express emotions due to lesions in
their prefrontal cortex with a group of emotionally healthy participants. See Antonie
Bechara & Antonio Damasio, The Somatic Market Hypothesis: A Neural Theory of
Economic Decision, 52 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336 (2005). The patients with impaired
emotional abilities had significantly decreased decision-making abilities even with respect
to routine decisions such as planning their day and choosing activities. Id. When the
healthy participants were asked to recall a strong emotional event prior to making a
decision, the accuracy of their decision was significantly affected. Id.
6
Prospect theory is an alternate theory of decision making that accounts for the values
people place on gains and losses instead of the probability of the outcome. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Martin D. Coleman, Sunk Cost and Commitment to
Medical Treatment, 29 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 121 (2010) (examining the psychological
tendency to continue to invest time, effort, and money in a failing outcome where there are
already significant “sunk” costs).
7
See Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
103 (2007).
8
See generally E.A. Akl et al., Using Alternative Statistical Formats for Presenting
Risks and Risk Reductions, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (2011),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD006776.pub2/full
(researching “the effects of using alternative statistical presentations of the same risks and
risk reductions on understanding, perception, persuasiveness and behavior of health
professionals, policy makers, and consumers”).
9
See infra notes 71–104 and accompanying text for a synthesis of the decisionmaking models that have evolved from these standards.
10
See infra notes 71–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substituted
judgment standard.
11
See infra notes 88–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the best interest
standard.
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what the incapacitated person would have chosen? The spectrum of possibilities
includes prior written directions, past conversations with the person before
incapacitation, current conversations with the incapacitated person, and what the
guardian knows about that person’s values and preferences.12 Even when prior
written directions exist to guide a guardian, the guardian might reasonably question
whether those directions would be different if the incapacitated person had known
at the time of writing all of the relevant information about current circumstances.13
When attempting to make a decision according to the best interest standard, a
guardian may have to navigate divergent opinions about what is best for the
incapacitated person. These opinions may come from a variety of sources,
including financial advisers, health care providers, the incapacitated person’s
family members, and close friends.14 Reasonable minds might differ on whether to
define best interest narrowly, by the consequences only to the incapacitated person,
or more broadly, to include consequences for significant others that the
incapacitated person, if competent, might have considered.15
This Article examines the complexities of the substituted judgment and best
interest standards and evaluates how effectively they provide a decision-making
paradigm for guardians. Because most states have statutes and case law on
standards for surrogate health care decisions, this Article focuses primarily on
other guardian decisions about the person and property of an incapacitated
individual. Part I reviews current statutory standards. Part II presents five decisionmaking models that synthesize divergent theories about the meaning of the
substituted judgment and best interest standards. Finally, Part III analyzes data
from our survey about the factors that influence guardian decisions. This analysis
includes observations about the extent to which surrogate decision-making theory
fits the reality of how guardians make decisions.

12

See infra notes 107–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of studies that
examined the role of these factors in decision making by surrogates; see also infra notes
121–175 for a discussion of the role these factors played in surrogate decisions made by
respondents to our survey.
13
For a critical examination of whether past statements are an accurate guide for
present surrogate health care decisions, see Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided
Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1824–41 (2003); see also
Pam R. Sailors, Autonomy, Benevolence, and Alzheimer’s Disease, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 184, 187–88 (2001) (arguing that preferences stated when competent
may not best serve the incapacitated successor self); Karen B. Hirschman et al., Why
Doesn’t a Family Member of a Person with Advanced Dementia Use a Substituted
Judgment When Making a Decision for That Person?, 14 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY
659, 665 (2006) (noting that surrogates for patients with advanced dementia struggle
between who their relative is now and who their relative was before the dementia).
14
See infra notes 107–120 and accompanying text for a discussion of studies that
examined the role of others’ opinions in decision making by surrogates; see also infra notes
121–175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role such opinions played in
surrogate decisions made by respondents to our survey.
15
See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
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II. STATUTORY STANDARDS
For the purposes of this Article, we reviewed each jurisdiction’s primary adult
guardianship statute to identify provisions that give guardians decision-making
reference points or standards. To keep the basis of inter-jurisdiction comparison
consistent, we excluded from review separate statutes for conservatorships,
protective services, veteran’s guardianships, public guardianships, and special
volunteer guardianship programs. A statutory provision qualified if it could fairly
be interpreted as containing substituted judgment language, best interest language,
or some combination of the two. We defined substituted judgment language
broadly to include any provision that directed a guardian to consider the
“desires,”16 “personal values,”17 “wishes,”18 “views,”19 or “preferences”20 of the
incapacitated person. Statutes were then categorized according to those that
contain substituted judgment language (with or without additional best interest
language), those that contain only best interest language, and those that are silent.
We chose to be over-inclusive in the analysis, counting all guardian provisions
with any substituted judgment or best interest language, even if the context of the
provision was something less than a stand-alone standard for decision making.

16

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011);
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008).
17
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2010) (“ethical values”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (LexisNexis
2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a)
(Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e)
(2010).
18
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); D.C. CODE § 212047(a)(6) (2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp.
2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005).
19
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2011).
20
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-57(f) (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a)
(West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008). One state statute does not
contain specific substituted judgment terminology but does require input from the
incapacitated person when possible. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2005)
(“Whenever meaningful communication is possible, a legally incapacitated individual’s
guardian shall consult with the legally incapacitated individual before making a major
decision affecting the legally incapacitated individual.”).
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Of the fifty-two jurisdictions examined,21 twenty-eight have guardianship
statutes with no general decision-making standard for guardians.22 Eighteen have
statutes that contain substituted judgment language,23 most in combination with a
best interest component.24 The statutes in six jurisdictions make reference to best
21

We reviewed the statutes of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands.
22
ALA. CODE §§ 26-2-2 to -55, 26-2A-1 to -160, 26-3-1 to -14, 26-5-1 to -54, 26-8-1
to -52, 26-9-1 to -5, 26-9-7 to -19 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.001 to .410
(2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-101 to -603, 28-66-101 to -124, 28-67-101 to -111
(2011); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1400–1490, 1500–1611, 1800–1970, 2100–2893 (2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3901–3997 (2007 & Supp. 2010); FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 744.101
to .715, 747.01 to .052 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-101 to -603
(West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1-1 to -13-3 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 633.551 to .682 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.010 to .990 (West 2011);
LA. CODE CIV. PROCEEDINGS ANN. art. 4542 to art. 4569 (1998 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1021 to 1034 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-101 to -105, 5301 to -432 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-101 to -222, 13-704 to -908
(LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.5-101 to -502 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-13-1 to -281 (2004 & Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-5101 to -638 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2601 to -2672 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 464-A:1 to :47 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-101 to -617 (LexisNexis 2011); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-26-01 to -29-31 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to
4-904 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 125.005 to .650 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5101 to -435 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-101 to 34-3-109 (2009 & Supp. 2012); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 601 to 916 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-101 to -433 (West
2004 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2602 to 3081 (West 2010) (however,
section 2797 requires a guardian to “manage the estate of his or her ward . . . in a manner
most beneficial to the ward,” which could be equated with a best interest standard); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1-101 to 3-3-1106 (2011).
23
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14314(1) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE
§ 21-2047(a)(6) (West Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e)
(West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B: 12-57(f) (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.2081.21 (McKinney
2006 & Supp. 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008).
24
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011 ); D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6)
(West Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp.
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5309(a) (West Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B: 12-57(f) (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2005); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(3)(i) (West 2008).
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interest, but without a substituted judgment component.25 The following discussion
further describes the statutory trends within these three groupings.
A. No General Decision-Making Standard
It is not surprising that more than half of the current guardianship statutes lack
a general decision-making standard. Even the original Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) did not articulate how guardians should make decisions. The 1969 UPC
stated only that a “guardian of an incapacitated person has the same powers, rights
and duties respecting his ward that a parent has respecting his unemancipated
minor child.”26 Fourteen of the jurisdictions with no articulated standard contain
similar language.27 Case law is thin on what it means for a guardian to have the
same powers, rights, and duties as a parent. The opinions that discuss this language
do so in the context of the guardian’s scope of authority rather than the process by
which guardians should make decisions.28 Nonetheless, a customary view is that

25

MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079,
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012).
26
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-312 (1969); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE OFFICIAL 1993
TEXT WITH COMMENTS 663 (11th ed. 1993).
27
ALA. CODE § 26-2A-78(a) (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(c)
(2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922(b) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-312 (2009);
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-8-1(a), (b)(1) (West 2010); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art.
4566(A) (Supp. 2011) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the relationship between
interdict and curator is the same as that between minor and tutor.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:1032(A) (2008) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the relationship between an
interdict and his curator or continuing tutor is the same as that between a minor and his
tutor, with respect to the person and property of the interdict.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18-A, § 5-312(a) (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b)(1) (LexisNexis
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-321(2) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)
(2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B) (LexisNexis 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5312(a) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312(2) (1993); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-201(e)
(2009).
28
See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 677–78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding on appeal that trial court interpreted “same powers, rights and duties respecting his
ward that a parent has respecting his unemancipated minor child” too narrowly when it
dismissed guardian’s action on behalf of ward for marital dissolution); Nelson v. Nelson,
878 P.2d 335, 339–40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning dismissal of guardian’s petition
for divorce on behalf of the ward, the court found that the statutory language “same rights,
powers, and duties respecting the ward as a parent has respecting a child” grants guardians
“exceedingly broad powers,” including “authority to interfere in the most intimately
personal concerns of an individual’s life”).
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guardians, having similar duties as parents, should act in the incapacitated person’s
best interest.29
A few of the jurisdictions with no general decision-making standard,
however, do provide a specific decision-making standard for medical decisions.30
Of these, some require medical decisions to be made according to a substituted
judgment standard if the wishes of the incapacitated person can be ascertained, but
if they cannot, the decision is to be made according to the incapacitated person’s
best interest.31 Others affirmatively obligate the guardian to follow directions
expressed prior to incapacity32 or, in the negative, not to contravene previously
expressed wishes.33 One jurisdiction—Delaware—directs that in matters of
medical consent, the incapacitated person’s best interest should come before the
personal beliefs of the guardian or those of the incapacitated person.34
B. Best Interest Language
Six states’ guardianship statutes contain an express reference to “best interest”
in the context of guardian duties but make no reference to substituted judgment.35
However, none of these statutes provides guidance as to what “best interest” means
or what the guardian should consider when determining whether a decision will
serve the incapacitated person’s best interest. Guardians are simply directed to act,
or exercise authority, in or for the best interest of the incapacitated person.36 When

29

Michael Casasanto et al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L.
REV. 543, 547 (1989) (“The Best Interest Standard mirrors the view that the guardian’s
duties are akin to those imposed on a parent.”).
30
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.150(c)(3), (e)(3) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3922(b)(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)(3) (1998); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (West Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(3)
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(e) (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
31
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)(3) (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
45-5-312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
32
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(3) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
464-A:25(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
33
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e)(3) (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5313(c)(4)(i) (West Supp. 2011).
34
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922(b)(3) (2007) (“The guardian shall not unreasonably
withhold such consent or approval nor withhold such consent or approval on account of
personal beliefs held by the guardian or the disabled person, but shall take such action as
the guardian objectively believes to be in the best interest of the disabled person.”).
35
MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079,
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012).
36
MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079,
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A-
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one adds these six jurisdictions to the fourteen jurisdictions that give guardians the
“same powers, rights and duties” as a parent37 it results in a total of twenty
jurisdictions that arguably follow a best interest standard. The lack of statutory
guidance on the meaning of “best interest” may explain, in part, why there is so
little case law on the meaning of the standard. Typically, best interest issues arise
in judicial opinions only when the guardian has egregiously breached the standard
by neglecting the incapacitated person,38 or by engaging in self-dealing.39
1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012).
37
See supra text accompanying note 27.
38
See, e.g., In re B.W., No. 04193, 2011 WL 24448373 (Del. Chp. June 3, 2011). In
that case, a nursing home petitioned the court to remove the daughter as guardian for her
mother because she chronically rejected prescribed treatment recommendations made by
the attending physicians. The daughter claimed that the nursing home and the physicians
were starving her mother by keeping her on a liquid diet. The daughter also claimed that
the court and others were in a conspiracy to harm her mother. The court removed the
daughter as guardian because her behavior was detrimental to the ward even though the
court believed that the guardian “firmly believes that her actions are in the best interest of
the ward.” Id. at *4. In the case In re Guardianship of Reed, No. 09AP-720, 2010 WL
369440 (Ohio Ct. App. 10 Dist. Feb. 2, 2010), the court denied a petition by the ward’s
daughter to remove the guardian. The petitioner disagreed with the physicians as to what
care was best for the ward. The court held that it could remove a guardian, who must act in
the best interest of the ward, for neglect of his duty. However, because the guardian was
performing his duty, his retention would be in the best interest of the ward. Id. at *5. In the
case In re Guardianship of Clark, No. 09AP-96, 2009 WL 2102154 (Ohio Ct. App. July
16, 2009), the daughter of the ward petitioned the court to remove the guardian on the
grounds that he failed to act in the best interest of the ward. The daughter alleged that the
guardian had restricted the daughter’s access to information about her mother’s medical
care and severely restricted her right to visit her mother. During the hearing on the petition,
evidence showed that the daughter had verbally assaulted and physically intimidated her
mother’s healthcare providers and attempted to meddle with her mother’s medications. On
appeal, the court held that the guardian’s restrictions on the daughter’s access to
information about her mother’s health care and visitation rights were reasonable. Id. at *10.
The court upheld the finding of the trial court that the guardian was acting in the best
interest of the ward. Id. at *1.
39
In the case In re Adler, No. 1144, 2003 WL 22053309 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 19,
2003), co-guardians requested judicial approval of gifts to accelerate eligibility for
Medicaid. Guardians were the niece and nephew of the ward, who had no children. Court
denied approval because the gift was not exclusively for the benefit of the incapacitated
person. Id. at *3. According to the court, the “ward receives no benefit from these gifts.”
Id. at *5. Although guardians can make gifts that are in the best interest of the ward, any
“taint of self-dealing will require a court to deny the request.” Id. at *6. Similarly, in the
case In re Guardianship of Jordan, 616 N.W. 2d 553 (Iowa 2000), the conservator of a
ward who owned a farm arranged to have the farm sold to a corporation that he controlled.
The sale was approved by a court as being in the ward’s best interest because sale proceeds
would pay off the ward’s nursing home bill and relieve the ward of the costs of maintaining
the property. The estate of the ward sued to overturn the sale. On appeal, the court held that
the costs of maintaining the property were minimal, and the proceeds of the installment
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C. Substituted Judgment Language
Eighteen jurisdictions incorporate some form of substituted judgment
standard into their guardianship statutes.40 Fourteen of these jurisdictions also
mention “best interest.”41 The most common form of substituted judgment standard
is based on language from Section 314(a) of the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act (Uniform Act):
Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian shall make decisions
regarding the ward’s support, care, education, health, and welfare. A
guardian shall exercise authority only as necessitated by the ward’s
limitations and, to the extent possible, shall encourage the ward to
participate in decisions, act on the ward’s own behalf, and develop or
regain the capacity to manage the ward’s personal affairs. A guardian, in
making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and personal
values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian. A guardian at all
times shall act in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable care,
diligence, and prudence.42
This language was added to the Uniform Act in 1997.43 Nine jurisdictions—
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin
Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia—have adopted substantially similar
language.44
Although the Uniform Act provision encourages guardians to utilize
substituted judgment by considering the “expressed desires and personal values of
the ward,” it does not make clear how the guardian is to balance this obligation
sale provided less income than did the rent that ward had previously received.
Consequently the sale was not in the ward’s best interest and should never have been
approved even though the sale price was fair. Id. at 560. Additionally, in Estate of Griffin,
611 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Surr. Ct. 1994), the conservator had chosen retirement benefits for the
ward that paid a joint, reduced lifetime allowance, providing to the conservator, for her life,
the same amount that was paid to the ward, if the conservator survived the ward. The
conservator could have selected payment options that would have resulted in greater
payments to the ward. The court held that it could authorize a self-dealing transaction if it
is in the best interest of the ward, id. at 745, but the conservator’s failure to seek prior court
approval breached her fiduciary responsibilities to the ward. Id. at 746.
40
See supra text accompanying note 23.
41
See supra text accompanying note 24.
42
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.pdf.
43
Id. § 314 cmt.
44
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. §
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-314(a) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 593075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010): VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010).
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with the obligation to “at all times . . . act in the ward’s best interest.” The original
comment to Section 314(a) did not address this tension:
The ward's personal values and expressed desires, whether past or
present, are to be considered when making decisions. Although the
guardian only need consider the ward's desires and values "to the extent
known to the guardian," that phrase should not be read as an escape or
excuse for the guardian. Instead, the guardian needs to make an effort to
learn the ward's personal values and ask the ward about the ward's
desires before the guardian makes a decision. Subsection (a) requires the
guardian to act in the ward's best interest. In determining the best interest
of the ward, the guardian should again consider the ward's personal
values and expressed desires.45
In the current Uniform Laws Annotated, revised commentary to Section
314(a) suggests that, whenever possible, a guardian should give more weight to
substituted judgment than best interest:
Although the guardian only need consider the ward’s desire and values to
the extent known to the guardian, that phrase should not be read as an
“out” for the guardian. Instead, the guardian must make an effort to learn
the ward’s personal values and ask the ward about the ward’s desires
before the guardian makes a decision. When the guardian is making
decisions for the ward, the guardian, wherever possible, should use the
substitute decision-making standard . . . . Only when a guardian is not
able to ascertain information about the ward’s preferences and desires
should a guardian use a traditional best interest decision-making
standard. In determining the best interest of the ward, the guardian
should again consider the ward’s personal values and expressed desires.
Instructive to a guardian in understanding substitute decision-making
would be the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Section 2(e) and the
line of “right to die” cases that discuss the substitute decision-making
process.46
While the revised commentary to Section 314(a) expresses a clear policy
preference for substituted judgment, the language of the Uniform Act remains
unchanged and the tension between substituted judgment and best interest
unresolved. Four states have provisions substantially similar to Section 314(a) but
use slightly different wording—the provision does not require that the guardian
shall “at all times” act in the incapacitated person’s best interest, but rather that the
45

UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314 cmt., available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.pdf.
46
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 370
(2003) (emphasis added).
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guardian “shall otherwise” act in the incapacitated person’s best interest.47 For
example, the relevant part of the Massachusetts statute provides, “[a] guardian, to
the extent known, shall consider the expressed desires and personal values of the
incapacitated person when making decisions, and shall otherwise act in the
incapacitated person’s best interest and exercise reasonable care, diligence, and
prudence.”48 A plausible explanation for this difference may be the legislative
intent that the guardian should consider best interest only when there are no
expressed desires and personal values to support substituted judgment.
Unfortunately, none of the statutes of the nine states with Section 314(a)–type
language provide guidance as to how the guardian should proceed when
substituted judgment and best interest conflict.
Unlike the Uniform Act language, the statutes in the District of Columbia and
Illinois provide a clear hierarchical approach to applying substituted judgment and
best interest, and unequivocally state a preference for substituted judgment when
possible. In the District of Columbia, the guardian shall “[m]ake decisions on
behalf of the ward by conforming as closely as possible to a standard of substituted
judgment or, if the ward’s wishes are unknown and remain unknown after
reasonable efforts to discern them, make the decision on the basis of the ward’s
best interests.”49 Illinois provides even more detailed guidance to the guardian:
Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward shall be made
in accordance with the following standards for decision making.
Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward may be made by
conforming as closely as possible to what the ward, if competent, would
have done or intended under the circumstances, taking into account
evidence that includes, but is not limited to, the ward’s personal,
philosophical, religious and moral beliefs, and ethical values relative to
the decision to be made by the guardian. Where possible, the guardian
shall determine how the ward would have made a decision based on the
ward’s previously expressed preferences, and make decisions in
accordance with the preferences of the ward. If the ward’s wishes are
unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to discern them,
the decision shall be made on the basis of the ward’s best interests as
determined by the guardian. In determining the ward’s best interests, the
guardian shall weigh the reason for and nature of the proposed action, the
benefit or necessity of the action, the possible risks and other
consequences of the proposed action, and any available alternatives and
their risks, consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any
other information, including the views of family and friends, that the

47

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402
(West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020 (E) (2011); W. VA. CODE § 44A-3-1(e) (2010).
48
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (West Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
49
D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6) (2010).
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guardian believes the ward would have considered if able to act for
herself or himself.50
In other jurisdictions that have both substituted judgment and best interest
language in their guardianship statutes, it is less clear how the two concepts
interrelate. Pennsylvania’s statute provides in pertinent part: “It shall be the duty of
the guardian of the person to assert the rights and best interests of the incapacitated
person. Expressed wishes and preferences of the incapacitated person shall be
respected to the greatest possible extent.”51 Similar to the Pennsylvania provision,
the New Jersey statute provides, “[A] guardian of the person of a ward shall
exercise authority over matters relating to the rights and best interest of the ward’s
personal needs, . . . a guardian shall give due regard to the preferences of the ward,
if known to the guardian or otherwise ascertainable upon reasonable inquiry.”52
Wisconsin requires that a guardian “[a]dvocate for the ward’s best interests”53 and
consider, consistent with the functional limitations of the incapacitated person,
“[t]he ward’s personal preferences and desires with regard to managing his or her
activities of daily living.”54
The remaining four states—Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, and New
York—have substituted judgment language in their statutes, but no express
mention of best interest.55 Guardians in Arizona are to consider the ward’s “values
and wishes,”56 while in Connecticut, the conservator is to “ascertain the conserved
person’s views,” and “make decisions in conformance with the conserved person’s
50

755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2011).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005). On petition by parental guardian
to authorize termination of life support for adult son in persistent vegetative state, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania opined that “where there is enough data for the decision
maker to ascertain what the patient would have desired, the decision maker must effectuate
substituted judgment.” In re Fiore, 673 A.2d 905, 912 n.11 (Pa. 1996). In such
circumstances, according to the court, “a best interest analysis may not be employed,”
suggesting that in Pennsylvania, the two tests are polar opposites. Id. Either the guardian
has “enough data” to know what the incapacitated person wants and so applies substituted
judgment or the guardian does not and so must use a best interest test. In Fiore, the court
permitted the guardian to consider “all aspects of [the ward’s] personality,” indicating a
very expansive notion of what factors a guardian can consider to invoke a substituted
judgment. Id. at 911; see also infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the expanded substituted judgment model.
52
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-57(f) (West 2007); see In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1280
(N.J. 1994) (“The substituted-judgment and best-interest tests are not dichotomous, but
represent points on a continuum of subjective and objective information leading to a
reliable decision that gives as much weight as possible to the right of self-determination.”).
53
WIS. STAT. § 54.18(1)(b) (West 2008).
54
WIS. STAT. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008).
55
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a656(b) (West Supp. 200410); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2002); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20, 81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. McKinney 2011).
56
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005).
51
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reasonable and informed expressed preferences.”57 Michigan simply provides that
“[w]henever meaningful communication is possible, a legally incapacitated
individual’s guardian shall consult with the legally incapacitated individual before
making a major decision affecting the legally incapacitated individual.”58 A
guardian in New York is required to “afford the incapacitated person the greatest
amount of independence and self-determination . . . in light of that person’s
functional level, understanding and appreciation of his or her functional
limitations, and personal wishes, preferences and desires.”59 Each of these statutes
encourages guardians to make decisions based on notions of substituted judgment,
but none address how the guardian is to make decisions if the values, views,
wishes, or preferences of the incapacitated person cannot be obtained.
In 2000, the National Guardianship Association (NGA) adopted standards of
practice which include Standard 7—Standards for Decision-Making.60 Standard 7
defines substituted judgment as “the principle of decision-making that substitutes,
as the guiding force in any surrogate decision made by the guardian, the decision
the ward would have made when competent.”61 Standard 7 further provides that
“Substituted Judgment is not used when following the ward’s wishes would cause
substantial harm to the ward or when the guardian cannot establish the ward’s prior
wishes.”62 If the guardian is unable to ascertain the ward’s “prior or current
wishes,” or if “following the ward’s wishes would cause substantial harm to the
ward,” then Standard 7 directs the guardian to use the best interest standard.63
There is a subtle, but significant, difference between the Uniform Act
language and the NGA standard. The Uniform Act language is ambiguous about
the relative weight that guardians should give substituted judgment versus best
interest. Without the benefit of the revised commentary, a guardian could sensibly
conclude that substituted judgment is to be employed only when doing so is also in
the incapacitated person’s best interest.64 In contrast, the NGA standard encourages
a guardian to use substituted judgment so long as the decision will not cause
substantial harm. In other words, under the NGA approach substituted judgment
trumps best interest except in circumstances where the decision would cause
substantial harm. The plain meaning of the Uniform Act language suggests that
best interest trumps substituted judgment if the two conflict.
On a continuum framed by protection on the one end and self-determination
on the other, the most protective standard would be one that favors best interest
over substituted judgment when the two conflict. The standard most deferential to
self-determination interests would be the hierarchy approach that favors substituted
57

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2010).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (LexisNexis 2005).
59
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012).
60
See NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, Standard 7: Standards for Decision-Making, in
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (3d ed. 2007).
61
Id. at 5.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 6.
64
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
58
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judgment over best interest whenever possible. The NGA approach offers a
compromise point somewhere between the two standards as it favors substituted
judgment—provided the decision will not result in substantial harm. Consider the
following example that demonstrates how these three approaches for balancing
substituted judgment and best interest might lead to different decisions:
Esther, a widow with considerable retirement assets, regularly supports
environmental organizations that work to save endangered species. On
numerous occasions Esther has told Helen, her niece, that she would
rather protect endangered species than accumulate possessions or leave a
large estate. Helen was recently appointed Esther’s guardian after a
stroke left Esther cognitively impaired. Helen must decide whether to
continue Esther’s large annual gifts to environmental organizations, or
conserve her assets to pay for the home care that Esther currently
receives. If Esther were moved to assisted living, there would likely be
enough assets to continue the gifts and pay for her care.
Under the Uniform Act language, Helen might decide that Esther’s best interest—
continued home care—trumps her wish to make large charitable gifts, and thus
choose to reduce or stop the gifts. If Helen follows the hierarchy approach, she
might decide to continue the gifts because Esther’s wishes are known and
unequivocal—it is what Esther would do if she were still able to decide for herself.
Helen might also decide to continue the gifts if she follows NGA Standard 7
because the consequence to Esther is something less than substantial harm—she
can receive adequate care in an assisted living residence rather than at home.
III. THE THEORY: SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND
BEST INTEREST—FIVE MODELS
Literature devoted to the substituted judgment and best interest standards
contains widely divergent opinions about the meaning and application of the
standards.65 To synthesize the spectrum of viewpoints, we have created five
representative models labeled: Strict Substituted Judgment,66 Expanded Substituted
Judgment,67 Strict Best Interest,68 Expanded Best Interest,69 and Hybrid Substituted
Judgment/Best Interest.70 For each model we have articulated a decision-making
standard and provided examples of how the standard might be applied.

65

See infra notes 71–104 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
67
See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
68
See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
69
See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
70
See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
66
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A. Strict Substituted Judgment Model
1. Decision-Making Standard
Decisions should be based on the incapacitated person’s prior directions and
expressed wishes.
The strict substituted judgment model requires the guardian to make decisions
based on actual knowledge of what the incapacitated person would have done.71
Actual knowledge can come from the incapacitated person’s prior directions or,
when there are no specific directions on point, the guardian can rely on the
incapacitated person’s reasonably instructive, previously expressed desires.72 Some
argue that when the guardian knows what the incapacitated person wants, the
guardian is not making a surrogate decision, but instead reporting a decision
already made by the incapacitated person.73 Proponents contend that strict
substituted judgment best protects the autonomy and self-determination interests of
the incapacitated person.74
The strict substituted judgment model has two shortcomings. First, some
argue that substituted judgment is unreliable because an individual’s preferences
change over time;75 choices made while competent may not be what a person
would direct if it were possible to know the wishes of the later incapacitated

71

Ursala K. Braun et al., Reconceptualizing the Experience of Surrogate Decision
Making: Reports vs Genuine Decisions, 7 ANNALS FAM. MED. 249, 249–52 (2009) (noting
the “high evidentiary standards” which must be met for substituted judgment).
72
Mark R. Tonelli, Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards
on a Sliding Scale, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 22–23 (1997) (observing that the various
formulations of the substituted judgment standard attempt to “incorporate the relevant
aspects of an individual’s previously expressed beliefs, values, and goals”).
73
Braun et al., supra note 71, at 252.
74
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–29 (1993) (providing a
discussion of how the doctrine of substituted judgment promotes individual autonomy).
75
See generally Alexia M. Torke et al., Substituted Judgment: The Limitations of
Autonomy in Surrogate Decision Making, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1514 (2008)
(providing an analysis of the unreliability of substituted judgment in the context of health
care decision making). Even when the issue concerns property, it would seem the greater
the time lag between a prior statement and the surrogate decision, the less certain the
guardian can be that the statement reflects what the incapacitated person might want now.
Some contend that “conclusively determining whether or not any type of surrogate makes
the decisions that an incapacitated person would have made for him or herself is
impossible.” Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care
Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42
GA. L. REV. 979, 994 (2008); see also Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823 (arguing that a
“reliance on advance treatment choice is misguided and morally troubling”).
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“successor” self.76 Second, the more pragmatic criticism of strict substituted
judgment is that lack of prior directions or express wishes severely limits what a
guardian can do.77 Mere suspicion or supposition will not suffice; the guardian
must have objective evidence of the incapacitated person’s actual intent.
2. Examples
Actual knowledge of the incapacitated person’s intent can come from prior
statements such as:
 “I want my dog, Fluffy, to be taken care of should anything happen to
me.”
 “I will pay for the cost of a college education for my niece Melanie at
XYZ University.”
 “Never sell my classic 1965 Mustang convertible.”
And, if there are no prior statements right on point, clearly expressed wishes
can suffice:
 Jim told his family before he became incapacitated that he was a strong
supporter of his church’s youth outreach program. When the church
proposed building a youth center, Jim had remarked, “You can count on
me to do my part.” Now Jim is incapacitated and the Church has
approached his guardian for a donation on Jim’s behalf. The guardian may
make the donation under a strict substituted judgment standard because
Jim’s desire to financially support the project is reasonably inferred from
his earlier general statements.

76

See generally Sailors, supra note 13, at 190–93 (arguing that a radical change in
someone’s personal identity can lead to the emergence of a “successor self” that should be
protected as if it were a distinct person).
77
The failure to give prior directions and authority through a power of attorney and
advance directives is usually the reason a guardianship must be established for an
incapacitated person. Although estimates vary on how many persons have executed health
care advance directives, a 2007 poll conducted by AARP found the “overall completion
rate of either a living will or a health care proxy document was only 29 percent.” Charles P.
Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK
Q. 211, 221 (2010).
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Many persons under a guardianship are not completely incapacitated. They
frequently have enough limited capacity to understand a question and express a
response. To the extent an incapacitated person can participate in a decision, the
guardian can use that expression as the basis for substituted judgment.78 For
example:
 Suppose Cally, age 77, is suffering from early stages of dementia and the
court appoints a guardian to handle her extensive assets. Prior to the
commencement of the guardianship, Cally had taken several extended
cruises with her twenty-eight-year-old granddaughter, Ginny. Cally always
paid all the cost of Ginny’s cruise. The guardian is approached by Ginny
who proposes that she take Cally on a three-week cruise at a cost of $7,000
each or a total of $14,000. The cruise quality is comparable to those that
she and Cally took in the past. The guardian asks Cally if she would like to
go on the cruise with Ginny. Cally, though confused, is clear that she
would like to go on the cruise. Under the doctrine of strict substituted
judgment, the guardian may approve the expenditure because Cally’s
current expression of her wishes is consistent with her past decisions and
conduct.
B. Expanded Substituted Judgment Model
1. Decision-Making Standard
Decisions may be based on the incapacitated person’s prior statements, actions,
values, and preferences.
The expanded substituted judgment model provides greater latitude as to the
kind of evidence used to ascertain the incapacitated person’s preferences and
lowers the degree of certainty required before the guardian can act.79 Under this
78

UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.htm; id. § 314 cmt.
(noting that, “the guardian must make an effort to learn the ward’s personal values and ask
the ward about the ward’s desires before the guardian makes a decision”); see, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (LexisNexis 2005) (“Whenever meaningful communication
is possible, a legally incapacitated individual’s guardian shall consult with the legally
incapacitated individual before making a major decision affecting the legally incapacitated
individual.”).
79
See Kathy Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of Forces
Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. 147, 165 (2005) (“Evidence of
precisely what the patient would have wanted, in the form of written advance directives or
oral statements . . . is useful, but it is not required. A decision made pursuant to a
substituted judgment standard can be determined by asking what a patient would have
wanted based on that patient’s values, beliefs, and attitudes.”). But ascertaining the
preference of an incapacitated person can be difficult. “In making a substituted judgment, a
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model, the guardian may look beyond definitive past statements for general
statements that reflect the incapacitated person’s attitude on a subject.80 The
guardian may also look to past actions, decisions, and even impressions about the
incapacitated person’s values to discern what the incapacitated person would do
under the present circumstances.81
The advantage of the expanded substituted judgment model over the strict
model is that a guardian is allowed to make reasonable inferences based on what is
known about the person, which may produce decisions that more closely
approximate what the incapacitated person would choose if still able to make
decisions.82 In theory, this model is appealing because it permits a personallytailored decision in circumstances where the incapacitated person did not
previously express specific expectations or directions. The strength of this model,
however, is also its weakness when the guardian does not have background upon
which to rely, even in an expanded notion of substituted judgment. For example, a
spouse acting as guardian usually has a broad range of past experiences upon
which to base surrogate decisions, but a professional guardian typically has had no
contact with an incapacitated person before the loss of capacity. The guardian with
no personal knowledge of the incapacitated person’s prior statements, actions,
values, and preferences must either obtain that information from other sources or
use a different standard for making the surrogate decision.83
Critics of the expanded substituted judgment concept question the reliability
of secondary sources of information about the incapacitated person’s values and
preferences.84 Even where the guardian has first-hand knowledge of these
proxy must interpret, construe, exegete another person’s autonomy from the complex,
multi-leveled, shifting text of that person’s life.” Bart J. Collopy, The Moral Underpinning
of the Proxy-Provider Relationship: Issues of Trust and Distrust, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
37, 40 (1999).
80
See supra note 51 (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of
substituted judgment); see also Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone:
Healthcare Decision Making for Unbefriended Older People, 31 HUM. RTS. 20, 22 (2004)
(recommending that long-term care facilities and staff should play a greater role in
“investigating and conveying resident values and preferences,” including developing
procedures for “collecting and using resident histories and values information”).
81
Karp & Wood, supra note 80, at 22.
82
See Daniel P. Sulmasy & Lois Snyder, Substituted Interests and Best Judgments,
304 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1946, 1946–47 (2010) (arguing that a “substituted interests”
approach, based on a patient’s “authentic values and interests” could permit a “best
judgment” on behalf of the incapacitated person in circumstances where a patient’s
preferences are unknown).
83
See infra notes 148–153, 167–175 and accompanying text (reporting that among
respondents to our survey, nonfamily guardians more often considered prior written
directions, current conversations, and what others told them about the values and
preferences of the incapacitated person in order to determine what the incapacitated person
would want).
84
Rebecca Dresser, Shiavo’s Legacy: The Need for an Objective Standard, 35
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 20 (2005) (“Decisions based on the substituted judgment standard
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preferences, some argue that surrogate decision makers are inherently biased by
their own perspectives.85 In addition, opponents of substituted judgment—whether
under a strict or expanded model—contend that a guardian cannot be sure that an
individual’s past statements reflect what the person might want under present
circumstances.86 Given the importance of present circumstances to a decision, they
argue that past pronouncements are little more than guesses as to how one might
react in the present.87
2. Examples
Notwithstanding criticisms of expanded substituted judgment, the following
examples illustrate how this model might facilitate a decision that would not be
possible under strict substituted judgment:
 Suppose that Millie, an incapacitated person, received a solicitation from
the local YWCA to make a gift of $1,000 to honor her deceased mother.
Millie’s mother had been a lifelong member of the YWCA. Millie, a past
member for ten years, once gave a $500 gift to the YWCA. Three years
ago Millie gave $1,000 to the United Way in memory of her mother. The
guardian believes that Millie might have approved of a donation to the
YWCA to honor her mother, but under a strict substituted judgment
standard, the guardian would lack sufficient evidence of that intent to
justify making the gift. Under the expanded substituted judgment standard,
the guardian can justify the gift as consistent with the totality of Millie’s
past conduct and decisions.
 The recently appointed professional guardian for Jane, age 85, was asked
to move Jane from her home to a safer living environment. The guardian
learned from Jane’s pastor that five years ago Jane helped her best friend
sell her house and move to assisted living after the friend was diagnosed
with Parkinson’s disease. Jane had remarked to the pastor, “Too many
older women continue to live alone in their houses long after it is safe to
do so.” If Jane is unable to engage in a current conversation about her
residential preferences, the guardian could conclude based on Jane’s past
acts and statements that she would approve of a move to an assisted living
facility.
can be influenced by people reporting and interpreting the evidence about patient’s
preferences.”); see also infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.
85
Dresser, supra note 84, at 21–22.
86
See generally Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823–24 (arguing that precommitment is
an “inferior strategy for making end-of-life decisions” and that “a person’s statements
about future care can be relevant” but are “just one element of a complex situation”);
Sailors, supra note 13 (arguing that changed circumstances make an individual’s past
statements an unreliable basis for current decision making).
87
Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823.
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C. Strict Best Interest Model
1. Decision-Making Standard
Decisions should be based on a comparison of the benefits and burdens from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.
The strict best interest model requires the guardian to make decisions that best
promote the well-being of the incapacitated person. Rather than attempting to
ascertain or project what the incapacitated person would do, the guardian is to
make decisions based on what a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s
circumstances would do, weighing the burdens and benefits of the proposed course
of action.88 The strict best interest model does not presume that the incapacitated
person is a reasonable person or would only act as a reasonable person would;
rather, the model attempts to foster decisions that are reasonable because they best
promote the well-being of the incapacitated person.89
The chief criticism of the strict best interest model is that it is paternalistic—it
trades off the self-determination interests of the incapacitated individual for the
benefit of protecting that person.90 However, this trade-off may be unavoidable
when substituted judgment is impossible because the desires or attitudes of the
incapacitated individual cannot be ascertained.91 Opinions vary about whether the
desires of the incapacitated person, when known, should take priority in guiding a
guardian’s decision.92 Proponents of the strict best interest model argue that the
incapacitated person’s wishes should be followed only when the course of action
also is the best to promote the well-being of the incapacitated person.93
The strict best interest model is further criticized because it does not
necessarily produce a fixed, objective decision. A guardian acting under this
standard must determine what is in the incapacitated person’s best interest, but
different guardians may reach different conclusions under similar circumstances.
88

Lawrence A. Frolik, Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?, 37 STETSON L. REV.
53, 69 (2007) (the best interests test manifests what a reasonable person would do); Loretta
Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of All
Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 187, 188 (2007) (best interest “guides decision-makers to
pick from among options that reasonable persons of good will would consider acceptable”).
Best interests can be divided into what is best for the present and what is best for one’s life
in an overall sense. Sailors, supra note 13, at 188.
89
See Sailors, supra note 13, at 188.
90
See Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public
Safety, 35 GA. L. REV. 593, 605 (2000).
91
Given that most individuals will not have expressed an opinion on the issue for
which a decision has to be made, in many cases the guardian will necessarily have to resort
to the best interest test. Cerminara, supra note 79, at 165.
92
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
93
See generally Sailors, supra note 13; Dresser, supra note 13 (both arguing that the
substituted judgment standard is an unreliable basis upon which to base current surrogate
decisions).
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Furthermore, the guardian’s decision may be influenced by the opinions of others
who have an interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare, including family
members, friends, and professionals such as clergy, health care providers, lawyers,
and financial advisers.94
2. Examples
The following examples illustrate how decisions under a strict best interest
model may differ from those made under substituted judgment models:
 The guardian for eighty-five-year-old Oliver must decide whether to
transfer the title of his BMW to his sixty-year-old son, Charles. Oliver has
moderate dementia and can no longer drive. Records substantiate that
Oliver’s past practice was to buy a new car every four years and give his
old car to his son. The BMW has a present market value of $20,000.
Oliver currently lives in an assisted living facility. His yearly expenses are
$72,000, but his annual income, composed of Social Security and a small
pension, is only $52,000. The shortfall each year is paid from his savings
which are currently valued at $100,000. At this rate, Oliver’s savings will
be exhausted in a little over 5 years. Despite Charles’s protests that Oliver
would want him to have the car, the guardian chooses to sell the BMW
because that is what a reasonably prudent person in Oliver’s circumstances
would do to conserve assets for future needs. This choice promotes
Oliver’s well-being without regard to the interests of anyone else. While a
substituted judgment standard might support making the gift of the car to
Charles, a strict best interest standard does not.
 Betty is a ninety-year-old widow who suffers from emphysema and mild
dementia. She lives in a remote area on a lake in a cabin-style home built
by her late husband. Her recently divorced granddaughter lives with her as
a helpmate and companion. Betty’s eldest daughter, Ann, is her guardian.
All of the family members are aware of Betty’s strong desire to live the
remainder of her life at the cabin. She has said many times, “I will live
here until they carry me out feet first.” Betty’s doctor recently ordered
oxygen as an assistive therapy for her breathing difficulties. Ann is
concerned about the frequent power outages at the cabin and has decided
over the objections of Betty, her granddaughter, and other family
94

In fact, such input is often encouraged. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a17(e) (West Supp. 2011) (“In determining the ward’s best interests, the guardian shall
weigh the reason for and nature of the proposed action, the benefit or necessity of the
action, the possible risks and other consequences of the proposed action, and any available
alternatives and their risks, consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any
other information, including the views of family and friends, that the guardian believes the
ward would have considered if able to act for herself or himself.”); see also Sulmasy &
Snyder, supra note 82, at 1946–47.
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members, to move Betty to an assisted living facility in town. She believes
this is the only decision consistent with Betty’s best interest. Under a
substituted judgment standard, Ann might choose instead to buy a
generator for the cabin, a decision that both reduces the risk to Betty and
respects her wish to live at the cabin.
D. Expanded Best Interest Model
1. Decision-Making Standard
Decisions should be based on a comparison of the benefits and burdens from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances, and
may include consideration of consequences for significant others if a reasonable
person might ordinarily consider such consequences.
The expanded best interest model recognizes that incapacitated persons do not
live in a vacuum and that guardians should be able to consider the consequences a
decision would have for people whose interests the incapacitated person would
ordinarily consider if competent.95 Such persons might include the incapacitated
person’s spouse, children, or other companions. Unlike the strict best interest
model, which focuses solely on the consequences to the incapacitated person,96 the

95

See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). There the court
was asked to approve a transplant of a kidney from one brother, who had been
incapacitated from birth, to another brother, whose kidneys were failing. Id. at 145–46.
Although the incapacitated brother could not opine as to whether he might want to donate a
kidney, the court nevertheless approved the donation as in the best interest of the
incapacitated brother because he would have been emotionally devastated if his brother
died. Id. at 149. Courts have often used the expanded best interest model under the label of
“substituted judgment” in circumstances where there was no evidence upon which a true
substituted judgment could be based. In Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99, 100–02, 35 Eng.
Rep. 878, 878–79 (Ch. 1816), the court granted the niece’s request for an increased
allowance from the estate of Hinde, her incapacitated uncle, because it believed that this is
what “the Lunatic himself would have done.” Id. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879. The court
opined that Hinde would likely prefer to support his niece rather than suffer the
embarrassment of her poverty. Id. The court did not cite any prior statements or acts by
Hinde that would support this opinion, but simply concluded that an increased allowance is
what Hinde would have done, “if he were in a capacity to exercise any discretion on the
subject.” Id. at 100 n.a, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878. Additionally, in In re Daly, 536 N.Y.S.2d 393
(Sur. 1988), the court approved annual gifts of $60,000 from the taxable estate of a person
who was profoundly disabled because of medical malpractice at birth. Thus, the court
could not rely on “subjective intent” and instead had to “employ an objective standard and
inquire as to what a reasonable and prudent person would do in the circumstances.” Id. at
395.
96
See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
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expanded model contemplates that most reasonable persons also consider the
impact of their decisions on others for whom they care.97
Of course, taking into consideration the interests of others raises the question
of whose interests should be considered and how much weight should be given to
those interests. A guardian making decisions under an expanded best interest
model is still obligated to promote the best interest of the incapacitated person
without becoming unduly influenced by the needs of others, no matter how
compelling. The primary criticism of the expanded best interest model is that
permitting guardians to consider the effect of their decisions on the well-being of
others, including themselves, may be the first step on a slippery slope leading to
exploitation of the incapacitated person.98
2. Examples
The following scenarios illustrate guardian decisions that rest on an expanded
best interest model—one that contemplates the impact not only on the
incapacitated person, but also on individuals whose interests the incapacitated
person would likely consider if competent to do so:
 Jed is a seventy-five-year-old widower who moved to a nursing home
because of his dementia. Jed owns a nine-year-old golden retriever, Lady,
who could not accompany him to the nursing home. Jed’s granddaughter,
Emily, is very close to her grandfather and to Lady. Emily and her mother
cannot keep the dog because their condominium association does not allow
pets. Jed’s guardian approves expenditures for Lady to live at a rescue
shelter where Emily can visit. Although Jed’s mental condition has
deteriorated to the point where he is unaware of the arrangements made for
Lady, the guardian knows it would have been very distressing for Emily if
Lady had been euthanized. The guardian believes that doing what a
compassionate person would do in Jed’s circumstances—if Jed could have
made the arrangements himself—is what is in the best interest of Jed,
Emily, and Lady.
 Joanne has dementia and can no longer live safely by herself. Her
daughter, Beth, a registered nurse, is planning to take a leave of absence so
that she can see to her mother’s care full time. Beth is also Joanne’s
97

See supra note 95.
In a discussion between author Linda S. Whitton and members of the National
Conference of Lawyers and Corporate Fiduciaries, corporate guardians stated that some of
their toughest decisions involve expenditures which provide an incidental benefit to family
members or companions of the incapacitated person. Examples include requests for funds
to go on vacation, do home renovations, and buy a new vehicle. The corporate guardians
indicated that they usually seek prior court approval of such expenditures—both to protect
the incapacitated person’s interests and to protect the guardian from potential liability.
Meeting in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 2011.
98
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guardian. Beth would like to use some of her mother’s money to convert a
family room into a first floor bedroom and bathroom for her mother’s use.
Beth is concerned that her siblings, all of whom live out of state, will claim
Beth is using her mother’s money to benefit herself. Beth is seeking court
approval to pay for the home modifications. The court may approve these
expenditures under an expanded best interest standard. Even though Beth
will receive an incidental benefit, the expenditures make it possible for
Joanne to avoid institutionalization and to receive care from someone who
loves her.
E. Hybrid Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Model
1. Decision-Making Standards
1) Decisions should be based on substituted judgment if there is evidence of what
the incapacitated person would have wanted; if not, then the decisions should be
based on the person’s best interest.
2) Decisions should be based on substituted judgment if there is evidence of what
the incapacitated person would have wanted and the decision also promotes the
incapacitated person’s best interest. If there is no evidence to support substituted
judgment, then the decision should be based on best interest.
As previously discussed, two predominant approaches have emerged in
jurisdictions with both substituted judgment and best interest standards in their
guardianship statutes.99 One is a hierarchical model, which requires the guardian to
first employ substituted judgment if there is evidence of what the incapacitated
person would want.100 Under this approach, a guardian is to resort to the best
interest standard only when evidence of what the incapacitated person would want
is lacking.101 A criticism of the hierarchical model is that it often fails to address
the reality of current circumstances and the relevant interests of incapacitated
persons because surrogates rarely know the incapacitated person’s precise
wishes.102
The other model—based on the Uniform Act’s language—encourages
substituted judgment provided that the decision is also in the incapacitated
person’s best interest.103 The guardian must first look to the expressed directions,
desires, and values of the incapacitated person as the starting point for decisionmaking and then craft a decision that promotes the incapacitated person’s best
interest.104 Of course, how the guardian interprets substituted judgment and best
99

See supra notes 40–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text.
101
See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text.
102
Sulmasy & Snyder, supra note 82, at 1946–47.
103
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
104
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
100
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interest—using the strict or expanded models—will also impact the outcome of the
decision-making process.
2. Examples
The following examples illustrate how guardians make decisions under the
hybrid substituted judgment/best interest models and how the decisions might
differ depending on the manner in which the model is applied.
 Mary had a long-standing practice of giving each of her three
grandchildren an annual gift of $5,000. After she became incapacitated,
four more grandchildren were born. Prior to her incapacity, Mary left
instructions to continue the annual gifts. Mary’s guardian must now decide
whether to continue the annual gifts and, if so, in what amounts. Before
Mary’s incapacitation, the annual gifts totaled $15,000. If the guardian
now makes annual $5,000 gifts to all of the grandchildren, the total annual
amount will be $35,000—more than double the past amount. Using a
hierarchical substituted judgment/best interest approach, the guardian
could decide to continue the $5,000 annual gifts for each grandchild.
Under the Uniform Act language, the guardian would more likely continue
the practice of annual gifts, in line with substituted judgment but, in
recognition of Mary’s need for costly long-term care, reduce the amount of
each gift to preserve Mary’s capital.
 Ann inherited a classic 1955 pink Thunderbird Convertible from her sister.
In her will, Ann leaves the car jointly to her sister’s children, Nick and
Nora. Ann now has dementia and resides in an assisted living facility. Her
guardian wants to stop paying storage costs for the car and must decide on
an appropriate solution. Nick has no interest in the car and Nora, although
she wants the car, cannot afford to buy out her brother’s share. The
guardian suggested transferring ownership of the car jointly to Nick and
Nora, but Nick refuses this arrangement. Under a hierarchical substituted
judgment/best interest approach, the guardian might decide to follow
Ann’s wishes and not sell the car—especially in light of Nora’s pleas that
waiting will allow her time to purchase her brother’s share. Under the
Uniform Act language, the guardian may decide that she must do what
promotes Ann’s best interest—sell the car now to save storage fees and
distribute the proceeds equally to Nick and Nora.
IV. THE REALITY: HOW GUARDIANS MAKE DECISIONS
Our literature review revealed almost no formalized study of how guardians
make decisions. Numerous studies have attempted to ascertain how accurately
health care surrogates can predict what still-competent patients would choose in
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various health care scenarios.105 While mixed, the results of these studies suggest
that surrogate’s predictions often miss the mark.106 Sifting through studies about
surrogate health care decisions, we found two that examined the role of substituted
judgment and best interest in the decision-making process. One study was
conducted by interviewing thirty family members of patients with advanced
dementia.107 The other was conducted using interviews with fifty surrogate
decision makers for older, chronically ill veterans.108
In the study conducted with the family members of dementia patients, the
interviewer read to the participants the following statement about decision-making
standards:
Some people tell us that when they make healthcare decisions for their
relative, they choose what they think their relative would have wanted.
Other people tell us that when they make healthcare decisions for their
relative they choose what is in their relative’s best interest. I’d like to
find out which of these you use when you make healthcare decisions for
your [relative]. Would you say you make decisions based on what he or
she would have wanted or based on what is in his or her best interest?109
After family members answered this initial question, they were asked follow-up
questions to elicit further explanations of how they made decisions.110 Although 43
percent of the surrogates claimed to use the substituted judgment standard and 57
percent the best interest standard,111 the responses to follow-up questions revealed
that only 7 percent used solely substituted judgment, 57 percent used best interest,
and 37 percent used a combination of the standards.112 The reasons given for using
both standards included: 1) there were no prior discussions about health care
preferences; 2) unrealistic prior expectations of the patient; 3) the need for family
consensus; 4) the need to consider the quality of life for the patient’s relatives; and
5) the influence of health care professionals.113
105

See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 996–98 (synthesizing the results of
patient-surrogate studies and concluding that (1) surrogates who do not know a patient’s
wishes often have difficulty predicting what the patient would want; (2) many surrogates
refuse to make decisions consistent with known wishes; and (3) surrogates often
mistakenly think they know a patient’s wishes).
106
Id. at 997–98 (noting that a review of sixteen studies covering nearly 20,000
patient-surrogate comparisons revealed only a 65 percent accuracy rate).
107
Hirschman et al., supra note 13, at 660–61.
108
Elizabeth K. Vig et al., Beyond Substituted Judgment: How Surrogates Navigate
End-of-Life Decision-Making, 54 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1688, 1688–89 (2006).
109
Hirschman et al., supra note 13, at 661 (alteration in original).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 663–64.
112
Id. at 663.
113
Id. at 665–66 (“Over half of the surrogates discussed the need for family consensus
on decisions[,]” and many “struggled with the difference between who their relative is
today (‘now self’) and who their relative was before the dementia (‘then self’).”).
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In the study conducted with surrogate decision makers for chronically ill
veterans, all interviewees had previously participated in a controlled trial to
promote advance care planning.114 They were interviewed by telephone and asked
to describe: 1) advance care planning conversations with the patient; 2) previous
decision-making experiences with the patient; and 3) how they planned to make
future health care decisions for the patient.115 Conversations with the surrogates
revealed five bases for past and future decisions. These bases and the percentage of
decision makers who applied them were: 1) conversations about the patient’s
preferences (66 percent); 2) reliance on written documents—no conversation
needed (10 percent); 3) shared values and life experience—conversations not
necessarily needed (16 percent); 4) the surrogate’s own beliefs, values, and
preferences (28 percent); and 5) seeking input from others in the surrogate’s
network, including shared decision making with other family members, clergy, and
clinicians (18 percent).116
Although 66 percent of the surrogates for chronically ill veterans planned to
make future decisions based on conversations with the patient, the interviews
revealed that the content of such conversations was often vague.117 Other
participants indicated that they did not need to rely on conversations because they
“will ‘just know’ what to do based upon presumed shared values.”118 The
surrogate’s values and beliefs also weighed heavily into the decision-making
process.119 The researchers concluded that “[s]ubstituted judgment has a value in
promoting patient autonomy during periods of decisional incapacity, but reliance
on this standard neither recognizes the surrogate stakeholder’s interests nor fits
with how many families make decisions.”120
A. Guardian Survey Design and Methodology
We used the findings from the foregoing studies to arrive at a list of decisionmaking factors for our Guardian Survey.121 The survey instructed respondent
guardians to indicate how much each of the following factors influenced them
when making decisions for an incapacitated person:
 What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest
 What family members of the Incapacitated Person think is in the
Incapacitated Person’s best interest
 What professionals say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest
114

Vig et al., supra note 108, at 1689.
Id.
116
Id. at 1690–91.
117
Id. at 1690–92.
118
Id. at 1691–92.
119
Id. at 1692.
120
Id.
121
See National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey, attached infra appendix.
115
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 What will create harmony or consensus among the Incapacitated Person’s
family members
 What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s circumstances
 What I think the Incapacitated Person would want122
They indicated these rankings on a Likert scale (1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 =
somewhat; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = a great deal; NA = not applicable).123 Two sets of
rankings were possible—one for financial and property decisions and one for
health care and personal decisions.124
If the guardian indicated that “[w]hat I think the Incapacitated Person would
want” was a factor in making decisions, then the guardian was asked to further
identify all of the following factors that contributed to knowledge of what the
incapacitated person would want:
 Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated
 Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
 Written directions given by the person before he or she became
incapacitated
 What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated Person
 What others have told me about the values and preferences of the
Incapacitated Person125
To avoid predisposing respondents’ answers, the survey did not explicitly label
decision-making factors as furthering substituted judgment or best interest, nor did
it indicate which statutory standard was applicable in the respondent guardian’s
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, three of the general decision-making factors on the
survey included the words “best interest.”126 The phrase “what the incapacitated
person would want” was used in lieu of “substituted judgment” as a means of
testing whether guardians used substituted judgment when they made decisions for
the incapacitated person.127 The goal of the survey was to ascertain what factors
122

See infra appendix.
See infra appendix. An independent samples t-test was used to compare the means
from the Likert scale to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in
the responses of guardians from the best interest jurisdiction versus those from the hybrid
jurisdictions and in the responses of family member guardians versus nonfamily member
guardians. See infra notes 136–140, 148–150, 157–159, 167–169 and accompanying text.
124
See infra appendix.
125
See infra appendix. A chi-square significance test was used to compare the yes/no
indications for these factors to determine whether there were statistically significant
differences in the responses of guardians from the best interest jurisdiction versus those
from the hybrid jurisdictions and in the responses of family member guardians versus
nonfamily member guardians. See infra notes 143–147, 151–153, 162–166, 171–175 and
accompanying text.
126
See infra appendix.
127
See infra appendix.
123
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influence guardian decisions and then determine whether those factors differ
depending on the jurisdiction’s statutory decision-making standard, the guardian’s
status as a family member or nonfamily member, and the type of decision.
Survey packets were distributed by volunteer attorneys who compiled mailing
lists from their adult guardianship client files. They attached mailing labels to preprepared survey packets, which included a self-addressed return envelope to permit
mailing of the anonymous responses directly to the authors. In addition to the
packets sent to private clients, Northern Indiana Adult Guardianship Services
distributed packets to individuals who serve as guardians in their volunteer
guardianship program. We were informed of the number of packets distributed in
each jurisdiction, but did not have access to the recipients’ identities.
B. Survey Response Profile
Of the 114 surveys distributed, 60 were returned, yielding a response rate of
slightly over 50 percent. The four participating states represented two types of
statutory decision-making standards—the best interest standard in Indiana128
(forty-one surveys) and the hybrid substituted judgment/best interest standard
(hybrid standard)129 in Georgia,130 Massachusetts,131 and South Dakota132 (nineteen
total surveys). The ratio of surveys returned to surveys distributed was
approximately 50 percent in each participating state.133 The number of family
member versus nonfamily guardians was almost evenly split in the hybrid states
(ten versus nine). In Indiana, the best interest state, almost twice as many family
member guardians as nonfamily member guardians participated (twenty-seven
versus fourteen). Of the twenty-three nonfamily member guardians who completed
the survey, ten identified themselves as volunteers, six as court-appointed, five as
professional guardians, and two as attorneys.
Guardians were asked whether they knew the incapacitated person before they
were appointed.134 Not surprising, most family member guardians knew the
incapacitated person before appointment (thirty-five out of thirty-seven) and most
128

Indiana does not have an explicit statutory best interest standard, but does contain
language in its statute indicating that “the guardian of an incapacitated person has, with
respect to the incapacitated person, the same responsibilities as those of a guardian of a
minor enumerated in subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4) . . . .” IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-81(b)(1) (West 2010). Subsection (a) of that section provides in part that the guardian of a
minor has “all of the responsibilities and authority of a parent . . . .” Id. § 29-3-8-1(a); see
supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the view that the duties of a
parent are akin to duties under the best interest standard.
129
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
130
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007).
131
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011).
132
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004).
133
The return ratios were as follows: Indiana (41/70), Georgia (6/10), Massachusetts
(10/17), and South Dakota (3/7).
134
See infra appendix.
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nonfamily member guardians did not (twenty-one out of twenty-three). Given the
strong correlation between family member status and prior knowledge of the
incapacitated person, we did not do a separate analysis of results based on whether
the guardian knew the incapacitated person before appointment.
Guardians were also asked to indicate whether they had authority to make
decisions about the finances or the property of the incapacitated person as well as
whether they had authority to make decisions about the health care or person of the
incapacitated individual.135 Not all guardians had authority to make both types of
decisions. Of the sixty respondents, forty-seven had authority to make decisions
about finances and property and fifty-four had authority to make decisions about
health care and the person.
C. Survey Results and Analysis
The following summary of results is organized first by type of decision—
financial/property or health care/personal. Then, for each type of decision, results
are analyzed according to the decision-making standard in the guardian’s
jurisdiction—best interest or hybrid, and whether the guardian respondent was a
family member or nonfamily member.
1. Factors That Influence Financial and Property Decisions
(a) Best Interest Standard Versus Hybrid Standard
Table F1 summarizes how guardians ranked the influence of various factors
on financial and property decisions. The mean responses from guardians in the best
interest jurisdiction (BI) are compared with the mean responses from guardians in
the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI). The two factors weighed most heavily by
respondents from both jurisdictions were “What I think is in the Incapacitated
Person’s best interest,”136 and “What I think the Incapacitated Person would
want.”137 However, compared to guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions, guardians
from the best interest jurisdiction gave significantly more weight to: 1) the views
of family members,138 2) family harmony and consensus,139 and 3) what the

135

See infra appendix.
Although guardians from both jurisdiction types gave this factor significant
weight, guardians in the best interest jurisdiction ranked this factor significantly higher
(5.00 ± 0) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.44 ± 1.04) (t(17) = 2.26, p=.037).
137
A significant majority of both groups responded that this factor influenced their
decisions a great deal (BI 70%; SJ 65%).
138
Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to
consider what family members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated
person’s best interest (4.54 ± 1.10) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.06 ± 1.16)
(t(42) = 4.29, p<.001).
136
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guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.140 Guardians
from both jurisdictions gave similar weight to the opinions of professionals.141
Table F1
Influence of Factors on Financial and Property Decisions
Factor

BI (Mean)

SJ/BI (Mean)

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What family members of the Incapacitated
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What professionals (such as accountants and
investment advisors) say is in the Incapacitated
Person’s best interest
What will create harmony or consensus among
the Incapacitated Person’s family members
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances
What I think the Incapacitated Person would
want

5.00

4.44

4.54

3.06

3.67

3.88

3.91

2.56

4.52

2.88

4.69

4.61

139

Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to
consider what would create harmony and consensus among family members (3.91 ± 1.35)
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.56 ± 1.2) (t(39) = 3.36, p=.002).
140
Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to
consider what they would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.52 ± .871)
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.88 ± 1.5) (t(22.5) = 4.12, p<.001).
141
The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction (3.67) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.88) was
not statistically significant.
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Table F2 summarizes what percentage of guardians from the best interest
jurisdiction (BI) and what percentage from the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI)
considered each of the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person
would want. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions did not consider
conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated,142 or prior
written directions.143 Although the majority of respondents did not consider prior
written directions, a significantly greater percentage of guardians from the hybrid
jurisdictions indicated that they did.144 A majority of guardians from both
jurisdictions considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the
incapacitated person.145 But a significantly greater percentage of guardians from
the hybrid jurisdictions used current conversations with the incapacitated person146
and what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated
person147 when assessing what the incapacitated person would want.

142

The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who did not consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated
(71 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who did not
consider such conversations (61 percent) was not statistically significant.
143
Although the majority of guardians in both jurisdiction types did not consider prior
written directions, guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to
consider prior written directions than guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2 = 4.68,
df=1, p=.03).
144
See supra note 143.
145
The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated
person (81 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who
considered this factor (89 percent) was not statistically significant.
146
Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider
current conversations with the incapacitated person than guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction (X2 = 5.86, df=1, p=.016).
147
Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider
what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person than
guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2=3.02, df=1, p=.082).
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Table F2
Factors that Helped the Guardian Know What
the Incapacitated Person Would Want
(Financial and Property Decisions)

Factors

BI
%
Conversations with the person before he or she became 29
incapacitated
48
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
Written directions given by the person before he or she 16
became incapacitated
What the Guardian knows about the values and 81
preferences of the Incapacitated Person
What others have told the Guardian about the values and 36
preferences of the Incapacitated Person

SJ/BI
%
39
83
44
89
61
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(b) Family Member Guardians Versus Nonfamily Member Guardians
Table F3 summarizes how family member guardians (FAM) versus nonfamily
member guardians (NON) ranked the influence of various factors on financial and
property decisions. Perhaps not surprising, family member guardians weighed
much more heavily than nonfamily guardians: 1) the views of family members,148
2) family harmony and consensus,149 and 3) what the guardian would want in the
incapacitated person’s circumstances.150
Table F3
Influence of Factors on Financial and Property Decisions
Factor

FAM (Mean)

NON (Mean)

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What family members of the Incapacitated
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What professionals (such as accountants and
investment advisors) say is in the Incapacitated
Person’s best interest
What will create harmony or consensus among
the Incapacitated Person’s family members
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances
What I think the Incapacitated Person would
want

4.94

4.43

4.27

2.91

3.61

4.08

3.73

2.18

4.52

2.38

4.71

4.54

148

Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what family
members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated person’s best interest
(4.27 ± 1.28) than nonfamily member guardians (2.91 ± .94) (t(42) = 3.24, p=.002).
149
Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what will
create harmony or consensus in the family (3.73 ± 1.34) than nonfamily member guardians
(2.18 ± 1.08) (t(39) = 3.45, p=.001).
150
Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what they
would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.52 ± .83) than nonfamily
members (2.38 ± 1.33) (t(15.89) = 5.39, p<.001).
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Table F4 summarizes what percentage of family member guardians (FAM)
and what percentage of nonfamily member guardians (NON) considered each of
the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person would want. Three
factors were considered more frequently by nonfamily member guardians when
making financial or property decisions: 1) prior written directions,151 2) current
conversations,152 and 3) what others told the guardian about the values and
preferences of the incapacitated person.153
Table F4
Factors that Helped the Guardian Know
What the Incapacitated Person Would Want
(Financial and Property Decisions)
Factors

FAM
%
Conversations with the person before he or she became 34
incapacitated
51
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
Written directions given by the person before he or she 14
became incapacitated
What the Guardian knows about the values and 83
preferences of the Incapacitated Person
What others have told the Guardian about the values 29
and preferences of the Incapacitated Person

151

NON
%
29
86
57
86
86

Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider the
incapacitated person’s prior written directions than family member guardians (X2 = 9.42,
df=1, p=.002).
152
Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider current
conversations with the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 = 4.95,
df=1, p=.026).
153
Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what
others have told them about the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 =
13.2, df=1, p<.001).
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2. Factors That Influence Health Care and Personal Decisions
(a) Best Interest Standard Versus Hybrid Standard
Table H1 summarizes how guardians ranked the influence of various factors
on health care and personal decisions. The mean responses from guardians in the
best interest jurisdiction (BI) are compared with the mean responses from
guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI). The comparison between responses
from the two types of jurisdictions is almost identical to the comparison of
responses for financial and property decisions.154 The two factors weighed most
heavily by respondents from both jurisdictions were “What I think is in the
Incapacitated Person’s best interest,”155 and “What I think the Incapacitated Person
would want.”156 Guardians from the best interest jurisdiction gave significantly
more weight than did guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions to: 1) the views of
family members,157 2) family harmony and consensus,158 and 3) what the guardian
would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.159 Guardians from both
jurisdictions gave similar weight to the opinions of professionals.160 Of note, the
mean weight given to the opinions of professionals was higher in both jurisdictions
for decisions about the health care and person of the incapacitated individual than
for financial and property decisions.161
154

See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.
The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction (4.84) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.28) was
not statistically significant.
156
The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction (4.53) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.83) was
not statistically significant.
157
Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to
consider what family members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated
person’s best interest (4.20 ± 1.22) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.17 ± 1.34)
(t(46) = 2.75, p=.009).
158
Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to
consider what would create harmony and consensus among the family members of the
incapacitated person (3.68 ± 1.42) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.28 ± 1.27)
(t(44) = 3.40, p=.001).
159
Guardians in the best interest jurisdictions were significantly more likely to
consider what they would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.24 ± 1.36)
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.24 ± 1.56) (t(53) = 2.41, p=.02).
160
The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction (4.58) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.22) was
not statistically significant.
161
Guardians in the best interest jurisdictions gave the views of professionals a mean
rating of 4.58 for health and personal decisions as compared to a mean rating of 3.67 for
financial and property decisions. Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions gave the views of
professionals a mean rating of 4.22 for health and personal decisions and a mean rating of
3.88 for financial and property decisions.
155
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Table H1
Influence of Factors on Health Care and Personal Decisions
Factor

BI (Mean)

SJ/BI (Mean)

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What family members of the Incapacitated
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What professionals (such as doctors and
caregivers) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What will create harmony or consensus among
the Incapacitated Person’s family members
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances
What I think the Incapacitated Person would
want

4.84

4.28

4.20

3.17

4.58

4.22

3.68

2.28

4.24

3.24

4.53

4.83

1528

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 3

Table H2 summarizes what percentage of guardians from the best interest
jurisdiction (BI) and what percentage from the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI)
considered each of the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person
would want. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions did not consider
conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated.162 The
majority in the best interest jurisdiction also did not consider prior written
directions, while the guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were evenly split on
whether they relied on prior written directions.163 A majority of guardians in both
jurisdictions relied on current conversations with the incapacitated person164 and
on what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person.165
Approximately half of the guardians from each type of jurisdiction also relied on
what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated
person.166

162

The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who did not consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated
(76 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who did not
consider such conversations (61percent) was not statistically significant.
163
Guardians in hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider prior
written directions than guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2=5.97, df=1, p=.015).
164
The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who considered current conversations with the incapacitated person (58 percent) and the
percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who considered current conversations
(78%) was not statistically significant.
165
The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated
person (71 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who
considered this factor (89 percent) was not statistically significant.
166
The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction
who considered what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated
person (47 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdiction who
considered this factor (50 percent) was not statistically significant.

2012]

SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING STANDARDS FOR GUARDIANS
Table H2
Factors That Helped the Guardian Know
What the Incapacitated Person Would Want
(Health Care and Personal Decisions)

Factors

BI
%
Conversations with the person before he or she became 24
incapacitated
58
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
Written directions given by the person before he or she 18
became incapacitated
What the Guardian knows about the values and 71
preferences of the Incapacitated Person
What others have told the Guardian about the values and 47
preferences of the Incapacitated Person

SJ/BI
%
39
78
50
89
50
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(b) Family Member Guardians Versus Nonfamily Member Guardians
Table H3 summarizes how family member guardians (FAM) versus
nonfamily member guardians (NON) ranked the influence of various factors on
health care and personal decisions. The comparison between responses from the
family member and nonfamily member guardians is almost identical to the
comparison of responses for financial and property decisions. Family member
guardians who made decisions about the health care or person of an incapacitated
individual weighed more heavily than nonfamily guardians: 1) the views of family
members,167 2) family harmony and consensus,168 and 3) what the guardian would
want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.169
Table H3
Influence of Factors on Health Care and Personal Decisions
Factor

FAM (Mean)

NON (Mean)

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What family members of the Incapacitated
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What professionals (such as doctors and
caregivers) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s
best interest
What will create harmony or consensus among
the Incapacitated Person’s family members
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances
What I think the Incapacitated Person would
want

4.91

4.24

4.06

3.27

4.54

4.33

3.56

2.14

4.49

2.95

4.76

4.43

167

Family member guardians were moderately more likely to consider what family
members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated person’s best interest
(4.06 ± 1.37) than nonfamily member guardians (3.27 ± 1.16) (t(46) = 1.95, p=.058).
168
Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what will
create harmony or consensus in the family (3.56 ± 1.52) than nonfamily member guardians
(2.14 ± .95) (t(38.36) = 3.84, p<.001).
169
Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what they
would want in the same circumstances (4.49 ± .92) than nonfamily member guardians (2.95
± 1.79) (t(24.84) = 3.58, p=.001).
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Table H4 summarizes what percentage of family member guardians (FAM)
and what percentage of nonfamily member guardians (NON) considered each of
the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person would want. The same
three factors were considered more often by nonfamily guardians in the context of
health care and personal decisions as were considered by those guardians in the
context of financial and property decisions:170 1) prior written directions,171 2)
current conversations,172 and 3) what others told the guardian about the values and
preferences of the incapacitated person.173 The majority of both types of guardians
did not rely on past conversations,174 but did rely on what they knew of the values
and preferences of the incapacitated person.175
Table H4
Factors That Helped the Guardian Know What the
Incapacitated Person Would Want
(Health Care and Personal Decisions)
Factors

FAM
%
Conversations with the person before he or she became 31
incapacitated
51
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
Written directions given by the person before he or she 14
became incapacitated
What the Guardian knows about the values and 77
preferences of the Incapacitated Person
What others have told the Guardian about the values 29
and preferences of the Incapacitated Person
170

NON
%
24
86
52
76
81

See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider the
incapacitated person’s written directions than family member guardians (X2 = 9.33, df=1,
p=.002).
172
Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider current
conversations with the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 = 6.725,
df=1, p=.01).
173
Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what
others have told them about the incapacitated person than family member guardians
(X2 = 14.42, df=1, p<.001).
174
The difference between the percentage of family member guardians who did not
consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated (69 percent)
and the percentage of nonfamily member guardians who did not consider such
conversations (76 percent) was not statistically significant.
175
The difference between the percentage of family member guardians who did rely
on what they knew of the values and preferences of the incapacitated person (77 percent)
and the percentage of nonfamily member guardians who relied on this factor (76 percent)
was not statistically significant.
171

1532

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 3

D. Survey Conclusions
The National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey was an exploratory
study. To our knowledge, it was the first to investigate what factors influence how
guardians make decisions. Specifically, we gathered data to determine whether the
decision-making standard, the family status of the guardian, and the type of
decision make a difference in the decision-making process. While our sample size
was modest—sixty guardians—the results, as analyzed under both an independent
samples t-test and a chi-square significance test, yielded statistically significant
results. The following conclusions summarize these findings. Further research is
warranted to ascertain whether these results will be replicated in another sample
and also to investigate what other factors might be material to the surrogate
decision-making process.
1. Decision-Making Standard
The survey results suggest that the statutory decision-making standard in a
jurisdiction does influence how guardians make decisions. While all guardians
indicated that they give significant consideration to what they think is in the
incapacitated person’s best interest and what they think the incapacitated person
would want, the relative importance of various decision-making factors and the
bases for determining what an incapacitated person would want differed
significantly with the type of jurisdiction. Guardians in the best interest
jurisdiction, for all types of decisions, gave more weight to the views of family
members, family harmony and consensus, and what the guardian would want in the
incapacitated person’s circumstances. For financial and property decisions,
guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions were more likely than guardians from the
best interest jurisdiction to rely on current conversations with the incapacitated
person and on what others told them about the incapacitated person’s values and
preferences.
The differences based on jurisdiction were less in the context of health care
and personal decisions. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions relied on
current conversations with the incapacitated person and on what they knew about
the values and preferences of the incapacitated person to determine what the
incapacitated person would want. Approximately half of the guardians in both
jurisdictions also relied on what others told them about the values and preferences
of the incapacitated person. While all guardians looked at similar factors to
determine what the incapacitated person would want, the guardians in the best
interest jurisdiction also gave significant weight to the views of family members,
family harmony and consensus, and what the guardian would want in the
incapacitated person’s circumstances.
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2. Family-Member Status of Guardian
The survey results suggest that the status of the guardian—family member or
nonfamily member—influences how guardians make decisions. For both types of
decisions—financial/property and health care/personal—family member guardians
gave greater weight to the views of family members, family harmony and
consensus, and what the guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s
circumstances. With respect to factors used to determine what the incapacitated
person would want—in other words, factors used to form a substituted judgment—
nonfamily member guardians more often considered prior written directions,
current conversations, and what others told them about the values and preferences
of the incapacitated person.
E. Reality and Theory
Results from the National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey suggest a
number of preliminary conclusions about the five theoretical models for guardian
decisions. First, it is unlikely that guardians make decisions using either a strict
best interest or a strict substituted judgment model. Nearly all respondents
indicated that when they make surrogate decisions they considered both the
incapacitated person’s best interest and what the incapacitated person would want.
Second, while guardians from the best interest jurisdiction claimed to consider
what the incapacitated person would want, they, more than guardians from the
hybrid jurisdictions, rated as influential survey factors that were linked to best
interest. Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction as well as family member
guardians were more likely to give weight to the views of family members, family
harmony and consensus, and what the guardians projected the incapacitated person
would want in the circumstances. Such considerations reflect what could be
understood as expanded best interest—taking into account consequences for
significant others that the incapacitated person likely would have considered.
Beyond expanded best interest notions, this approach might also be understood as
the most protective, as it seeks the broadest range of opinion about what is best for
the incapacitated person. On the other hand, consideration of family harmony and
consensus, without safeguards, could lead to decisions that favor family members
to the detriment of the incapacitated person. Without a clear statutory standard, an
almost infinite range of possibilities exist for how a guardian might make a
decision under an expanded notion of best interest.
Third, although guardians from both jurisdictions favored using substituted
judgment at least in part, the survey responses do not provide much of an
explanation for how guardians in the best interest jurisdiction planned to determine
what the incapacitated person would want. Most of these guardians appeared to use
an expanded notion of substituted judgment based on what the guardian knew
about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person; however, the source
of this knowledge was unclear. Less than half of the guardians used current
conversations with the incapacitated person, and an even smaller percentage
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considered past conversations, written directions, and what others told the guardian
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. These results are similar
to those found in the study conducted with surrogates for chronically ill
veterans.176 In that study, many of the surrogates presumed to know what the
incapacitated person would want but based the belief on factors such as presumed
shared values, vague conversations, and the surrogate’s own values, beliefs, and
preferences rather than on direct evidence of the incapacitated person’s desires.177
Fourth, guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions, when making decisions,
appeared to consider some combination of substituted judgment and best interest
factors. The relative importance of substituted judgment appeared greater in the
hybrid jurisdictions than in the best interest jurisdiction, as evidenced by more
guardian reliance on current conversations, the guardian’s knowledge of the
incapacitated person’s values and preferences, and what others told the guardian
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. In addition, written
directions were used by 44 percent of the guardians for financial and property
decisions and by 50 percent of the guardians for health care decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Guardians have little statutory or case law to guide them on how to make
decisions for incapacitated persons. The majority of jurisdictions have no
articulated decision-making standard for non–health care decisions but most likely
follow a general custom of “best interest.” Fourteen jurisdictions have adopted a
combination of substituted judgment and best interest standards, but most fail to
clarify for guardians the manner in which these standards should be applied.
Theories about the use of substituted judgment and best interest range from a
strict substituted judgment approach, which requires that decisions follow the
incapacitated person’s prior directions, to a strict best interest approach, which
dictates that decision makers may only consider actions that will promote the
incapacitated person’s welfare. The Uniform Act language and the National
Guardianship Association (NGA) standard represent hybrid approaches; each
recognizes that often no information exists upon which to base a true substituted
judgment and that a true substituted judgment, when possible, might sometimes be
harmful to the incapacitated person.
Empirical research conducted in best interest and hybrid substituted
judgment/best interest jurisdictions revealed that nearly all guardians attempt to
consider both standards when they make decisions for an incapacitated person.
Survey results, however, showed that guardians in a best interest jurisdiction
tended to favor decision-making factors related to best interest, such as the views
of family members and what the guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s
circumstances, and that guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions tended to rely more on
decision-making factors related to substituted judgment, such as current
176
177

See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.
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conversations with the incapacitated person and what others had told the guardian
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. This research suggests
that 1) most guardians use some blend of best interest and substituted judgment
standards when they make decisions; 2) statutory decision-making standards
influence the way guardians make decisions; and 3) law reform is needed to create
statutory standards that provide adequate guidance for guardians. Further empirical
research is warranted to determine whether these findings will be replicated and to
investigate what other factors may be material to the surrogate decision-making
process. Such research would be beneficial both to law reform efforts and
development of guardian best practices.
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NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP SUMMIT
GUARDIAN SURVEY
Thank you for completing this survey about how you make decisions as a
Guardian. Please check or circle (where indicated) your responses and return the
completed survey by May 31, 2011.
Note: If you are currently serving (or have served) as Guardian for more than
one Incapacitated Person, please base your answers on the most recent
Guardianship appointment.
1. I am:
 currently serving as a Guardian.
 no longer a Guardian but have served as one in the past.
2. Please select the capacity in which you are (were) serving as a Guardian:
 Family member
 Non-family member volunteer
 Other: ____________________________________________
(If “Other,” please indicate in what capacity you came to be appointed as a
Guardian—e.g., professional guardian, public guardian, attorney or social
worker appointed by the court, etc.)
3. Did you know the Incapacitated Person before you were appointed to serve as
Guardian?
 Yes  No
If “Yes,” how long did you know the Incapacitated Person before appointment?
 Less than 60 days
 60 days to 1 year
 Over 1 year
4. Please indicate all types of decisions you have (had) authority to make as a
Guardian:
 Decisions about the finances or property of the Incapacitated
Person
 Decisions about the health care or person of the Incapacitated
Person
5. Did you receive instructions from the court or anyone else about what factors
you should consider when you make decisions for the Incapacitated Person?
 Yes
 No
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IF you make FINANCIAL or PROPERTY decisions for the Incapacitated
Person . . .
(If you do not make these decisions, please skip to question #7).
6. How much does (did) each of the following influence you when making financial or
property decisions for the Incapacitated Person?
1 = not at all

2 = a little
3 = somewhat
4 = quite a bit
5 = a great deal NA = not applicable

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best
interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What family members of the Incapacitated Person think
is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What professionals (such as accountants and investment
advisors) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best
interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What will create harmony or consensus among the
Incapacitated Person’s family members

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What I think the Incapacitated Person would want

1

2

3

4

5

NA

 6a. If “what you think the Incapacitated Person would want” is one of
your considerations, please indicate which of the following factors have
helped you to know what the Incapacitated Person would want (Check
all that apply):
 Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated
 Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
 Written directions given by the person before he or she became
incapacitated
 What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated
Person
 What others have told me about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated
Person
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IF you make HEALTH CARE or PERSONAL decisions for the Incapacitated
Person . . .
(If you do not make these decisions, please skip to question #8).
7. How much does (did) each of the following influence you when making health care or
personal decisions for the Incapacitated Person?
1 = not at all

2 = a little
3 = somewhat
4 = quite a bit
5 = a great deal NA = not applicable

What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best
interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What family members of the Incapacitated Person think
is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What professionals (such as accountants and investment
advisors) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best
interest

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What will create harmony or consensus among the
Incapacitated Person’s family members

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s
circumstances

1

2

3

4

5

NA

What I think the Incapacitated Person would want

1

2

3

4

5

NA

 7a. If “what you think the Incapacitated Person would want” is one of
your considerations, please indicate which of the following factors have
helped you to know what the Incapacitated Person would want (Check
all that apply):
 Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated
 Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person
 Written directions given by the person before he or she became
incapacitated
 What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated
Person
 What others have told me about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated
Person
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8. Please tell us a little about yourself:
Gender:  Male  Female
Age:

 18–29

 30–49

 50–69

 70 or older

Please choose the race or ethnicity that best applies to you:
 African American/Black
 White, not Hispanic
 Native American
 Latino/Hispanic
 Asia
 Arab
 Other_____________________
How long you have served as a Guardian?:
 Less than 1 year
 1-3 years
 Over 3 years
9. Please feel free to share other factors that you consider when you make
decisions for the Incapacitated Person:

Return survey in the envelope provided, or mail to:
Professor Linda S. Whitton
Valparaiso University
School of Law
Valparaiso, Indiana
For more information please email: linda.whitton@valpo.edu
Thank you for your participation!

